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Abstract: 
This article aims to identify the institutional factors that make a referendum successful. This 
comparative analysis seeks to explain the success of top-down referendums organized in 
Europe between 2001 and 2013. It argues and tests for the main effect of three institutional 
factors (popularity of the initiator, size of parliamentary majority, and political cues during 
referendum campaigns) and controls for the type of referendum and voter turnout. The analysis 
uses data collected from referendums and electoral databases, public opinion surveys, and 
newspaper articles. Results show that referendums proposed by a large parliamentary majority 
or with clear messages from political parties during campaign are likely to be successful.   
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Introduction 
The modern crisis of representative democracy has several facets: political distrust, general 
political dissatisfaction of citizens with political institutions and widespread perception that 
politicians disregard the popular concerns (Dalton 2008; Norris 2011; Geissel and Newton 
2012). The discussion about this crisis is not new, it began in the 1960s (Joas 2013) and since 
then the general opinion has been that 'the cure for democracies' ills is more democracy' 
(Dalton, Cain, and Scarrow 2003, 251). As a consequence, a variety of direct democratic and 
deliberative tools were implemented and increasingly used for several decades throughout the 
world (LeDuc 2003; Kriesi 2012a; Newton 2012; Setala and Schiller 2012). Among these, direct 
democratic tools allow citizens to participate in the decision-making process and thus 
complement the representative democracy. Referendums, the most frequently used form of 
direct democracy, provide inclusive and effective participation, and have a strong legitimizing 
impact (Setala 2013, 194).  
This high importance of referendums in contemporary politics attracted attention about 
what makes referendums successful (i.e. the adoption of the issue subjected to vote). Existing 
research provided in-depth analyses of referendums in individual countries, investigated 
referendums in particular periods (de Vreese and Semetko 2004; Hobolt 2007; Batory 2007), 
examined the influence of particular factors for the outcome of a referendum (Siune and 
Svensson 1993; M. Franklin, Marsh, and Wlezien 1994; M. N. Franklin, van der Eijk, and Marsh 
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1995) or analyzed several determinants for the success of referendums (Hug 2003; Hobolt 
2009). This paper follows the tradition initiated by this literature and seeks to reveal the sources 
of a successful outcome of referendums. In doing so, the analysis empirically tests for the effect 
of three institutional factors (popularity of the initiator, size of parliamentary majority, and 
political cues during referendum campaigns) and controls for the type of referendum and voter 
turnout in all referendums initiated in Europe by the national government or parliament 
between 2001 and 2013. In total, there are 31 referendums in 15 countries. The analysis uses 
data collected from referendums and electoral databases, public opinion surveys, and 
newspaper articles. 
 The first section of the paper reviews the major institutional explanations on the outcome 
of referendums and identifies three causal mechanisms that can determine the success of a 
referendum and formulates testable hypotheses. The following section includes the research 
design and variable operationalization. The third section is dedicated to the bivariate and 
multivariate (binary logistic regression) analysis. The conclusions summarize the key findings, 
discuss the methodological and empirical implications of this analysis and draws attention to 
avenues for future research. 
 
Institutional sources of successful referendums 
According to Luthardt (1994, 166), the definition of success of a referendum depends on the 
functions and motives of its initiation. Broadly speaking, a referendum is successful if it fulfils 
the motives for its initiation. This can mean the victory of an initiator in the battle for votes 
and thus the adoption of a referendum issue. Also, the victory can confirm the popularity of 
the initiator and serve as a political power measurement, possibly avoiding a split within a 
party or the isolation of the initiator if that is a public person (e.g. president or prime-minister). 
Another possibility to define a referendum is to look at the outcomes, as opposed to the 
motives and functions. In this sense, the success has the result at the ballot as a point of 
reference and more precisely looking at the majority voting in favour of a proposal (Williams 
and Hume 2010). Along these lines, Lacy and Niou  (2000) consider a referendum to be 
successful relative to its outcome: adoption (success) vs. rejection (failure). Qvortrup (2005, 
73) uses a similar approach and argues that a referendum is successful when a majority of 
voters accepts the proposed policy. In this article, we follow the dominant approach in the 
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literature and conceptualize a referendum as successful when a majority of the electorate 
favoured the proposal subjected to popular vote.  
 So far, the result of a referendum was often regarded through the lenses of institutions 
that followed several lines of argumentation. In his analysis of referendums organized between 
1975 and 2000 in 39 countries LeDuc (2003, 165) concluded that factors that are usually 
considered in studies of elections - ideology, parties, partisanship, impact of campaign and the 
role of media – affect the outcome of a referendum in much the same way. For example, 
ideology works in a similar manner: if voters can easily locate an issue on a left-right spectrum, 
they might more effortlessly form their own opinions on the issue. Ideology, like party 
identification, is an example of Zaller`s ‘predispositions’ (LeDuc 2003, 176). According to Zaller 
(1992, p.6), ‘every opinion is a marriage of information and predisposition’. Predispositions and 
information do not operate independently from each other, but rather predispositions 
determine what information or third-party opinion a citizen accepts, since people tend to ignore 
the information or opinions that do not agree with their prejudices and orientations 
(Marcinkowski 2007, 95).  
 Another line of argument pointed out that financing in campaigns may have an effect on 
the outcome of the referendum. Nevertheless, empirical evidence nuances this argument and 
illustrates a limited influence of money for the outcome of referendums (Gilland Lutz and Hug 
2009). In his study of the Swiss referendums Kriesi (2012b) shows that money make a small 
difference especially with respect to turnout but do not have an impact on the outcome per se. 
A different strand of research emphasizes the role of diffusion channels in the success of a 
referendum. These channels function like transmission belts such as shared language, common 
media sources, and collaborative networks in the form of physical contacts and discussions 
among campaigners. The key argument is that the way in which a campaign is conducted in one 
referendum and its results may influence another referendum, happening in a similar setting. 
One example in this sense is the way in which the campaign in France influenced the 
Luxembourg referendum campaign about the 2005 EU Constitutional Treaty (Atikcan 2015, 37).  
 Walker (Walker 2003, 92–93) studied referendums organized in France and Chile in the 
1970s and 1980s and in the Soviet Union in the 1990s and showed that executives had better 
chances to win a referendum than legislatives because people were ‘positioned closer to the 
executives’. The examples in the investigated countries show that in two of them there were 
strong leaders - Charles de Gaulle and Augusto Pinochet – who tried to increase their power 
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against other institutions through the use of referendums. In the Soviet Union, during its 
breakdown, republics used referendums to distribute power from the center, mainly aimed to 
resolve disputes and serving as a bargaining instrument between elites in different institutional 
settings (Walker 2003, 3). One possible explanation for the higher chances of executives to win 
a referendum is that government performance and especially the people’s perception about its 
performance in an important determinant of a referendum’s outcome (de Vreese and Semetko 
2004). In his analysis of all 43 EU-related referendums since 1972, Qvortrup (2016) shows that 
governments tend to lose referendums if they have been in office for a long time. At the same 
time, perceptions play a high role in the voting behaviour since emotive words on the ballot 
paper appear to favour a high yes vote. 
 This paper focuses on three variables that capture most of the mechanisms explored in 
the literature: the initiator`s popularity among the citizens (i.e. initiator, government vs. 
opposition), support within the parliament, and party cues, i.e. reflecting partisanship, ideology, 
and information shortcuts). We also control for turnout and type of referendum to cover the 
remaining potential explanations. Citizens’ evaluations at individual level were not included in 
the analysis. While these would have been useful to identify attitudes towards the issue and 
suitable for a test regarding the second-order theory of voting in referendums, they were left 
out for both methodological (they reflect a different level of analysis) and empirical reasons 
(data availability). This section formulates hypotheses for the three main effects and briefly 
discusses the potential impact of control variables.  
 The initiator is one of the key factors in the institutional design of a referendum (Setala 
2009, 4, 10). This is in line with an earlier statement that a referendum is mostly a product of ‘a 
conscious political decision taken by a party, organization or group (LeDuc 2002, 148). One of 
the main reasons why referendums are often popular among elites is their ability to take 
advantage of the referendum process and influence it (Walker 2003, p.120). According to the 
discourse used by the initiators, there are two main perspectives on the role of the government 
in a referendum. The first perspective (‘issue-voting’) suggests that the voting decision of 
citizens is influenced by the attitudes towards the voted issue. People who are generally 
positive towards European integration are likely to support a new EU treaty and vote ‘Yes’. 
Contrarily, people who are generally skeptical about the EU project will vote ‘No’ to further 
integration (Siune and Svensson 1993; Siune, Svensson, and Tonsgaard 1994).  
 The second perspective (‘second-order’ voting) indicates that the attitudes towards the 
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national political parties and the incumbent government decide the vote. Reif and Schmitt 
(1980) pioneered the idea that elections for the European Parliament are ‘second-order 
national elections’, i.e. considerations about national politics (‘first-order’ elections) determine 
voting choice. Accordingly, European referendums do not directly concern continental Europe 
but rather serve as ‘second order’ elections for voters to express their support or lack of support 
for their governments (M. Franklin, Marsh, and Wlezien 1994; M. N. Franklin, van der Eijk, and 
Marsh 1995; M. N. Franklin 2002). Voters who are not satisfied with the performance of the 
incumbent government may use the opportunity to punish the government by not following its 
recommendation. Voters who are satisfied with their government vote in line with its wishes. 
Thus, an EU referendum becomes a second general election (Garry, Marsh, and Sinnott 2005, 
204) and the popularity of the government is a decisive factor for the outcome of the 
referendum: ‘While a popular government might expect to see its referendum proposals 
approved, an unpopular government will often see its proposals turned down’ (M. N. Franklin, 
van der Eijk, and Marsh 1995, 106).  
 ‘Issue voting’ versus ‘second-order voting’ has been the dominant debate in the 
referendum behavior research since the end of the 1970s (Svensson 2007, 163). There is 
empirical evidence to support both perspectives. For instance, Siune and Svensson (1993) argue 
that the main explanation for the 1992 failed referendum were the attitudes of the Danish 
population towards further integration, their fear for the loss of national sovereignty by giving 
more and more political power to the EU. Franklin et al. (1994, 117–18) investigated the 
relationship between government approval and support for the Maastricht Treaty in Denmark, 
France and Ireland where referendums were held in 1992. Their research showed that in all 
three countries the overwhelming majority of those who supported the government voted ‘Yes’ 
to the Maastricht Treaty, while those who were unhappy with the performance of their 
government - voted ‘No’.  
 According to Franklin et al., the crucial role of government`s popularity was confirmed by 
the approval of the Maastricht Treaty one year later. This was interpreted by Siune and 
Svensson as a reaction to the obtained concessions in the application of the Treaty to Denmark. 
However, as the post-referendum poll showed only 17 per cent knew about the Edinburgh 
concessions and only 2 per cent could name the four opt-out clauses (M. Franklin, Marsh, and 
Wlezien 1994, 120). The success of the referendum could be explained by the fact that the 
unpopular government had been replaced by a much more popular government that was able 
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to translate its support into votes in favor of the Treaty (M. Franklin, Marsh, and Wlezien 1994, 
120). 
Using the evidence from the two Irish referendums on the Nice Treaty in 2001 and 2002, 
Garry et al. (2005) found that the issue-voting model outperformed the second-order model in 
both referendums. In the first referendum in 2001 Irish citizens rejected the treaty, but 
endorsed it the second time. The satisfaction with the government was significantly lower at 
Nice 2 than at Nice 1, but the referendum issue passed. The intensity of the campaign though 
was much higher at Nice 2. These results showed that attitudes towards the issue played a more 
important role in voters` decision than second-order considerations. 
 LeDuc (2003, 176) concludes that ‘in referendums, as in elections, the messenger often 
matters as much as the message’. Although there are no candidate names on the ballot, the 
arguments are delivered by established political parties and their leaders about whom voters 
already have their opinions. In this sense, President Mitterrand`s unpopularity and the 
widespread discontent with the political class in France contributed to the erosion of public 
support for the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. Similarly, the personal popularity of Felipe Gonzalez 
played an important role for the approval of Spain`s continued membership in the NATO in 1986 
(LeDuc 2003, 176–77). The study of the Danish referendum on the Euro in 2001 showed that if 
a government is popular, a referendum has better chances for success (de Vreese and Semetko 
2004). Research of referendums in 11 European countries and Canada between 1986 and 2006 
also supported the importance of the government`s popularity for the successful outcome of a 
referendum (LeDuc 2009). In line with these arguments, we expect that:  
 
H1: The high popularity of the initiator increases the likelihood for a referendum’s success.  
 
When the referendum is not initiated by the government but by the parliamentary majority or 
minority, the coalition built to organize the referendum campaign could play an important role. 
In their analysis of all referendums and initiatives voted on in Switzerland since 1947 Trechsel 
and Sciarini (1998, 118–20) conclude that there is a straightforward dependency between the 
level of consensus that was reached in the parliamentary process and the chances of success at 
the polls. Accordingly, we expect that the size of the parliamentary majority initiating a 
referendum will have a positive impact on its success.  
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H2: A large parliamentary majority increases the likelihood for a referendum’s success. 
 
The objective of a political campaign is to influence the outcome of a referendum by shaping 
public opinion (Schmitt-Beck and Farrell 2002, 3). The campaign is supposed to increase 
knowledge levels among the citizens and encourage them to vote (de Vreese and Semetko 
2004, 45). The more familiar voters become with the topic, the higher the probability of their 
turnout at the polls (Kriesi 2005; Sager and Buehlmann 2009). Contemporary campaigns are 
influenced by the relatively new phenomenon of the late deciding voter which can be traced 
back to partisan dealignment beginning in the 1960s (Lachat and Sciarini 2002; McAllister 2002). 
This trend fosters a party strategy based on debate and factual information rather than a 
superficial campaign of slogans and sound bites (McAllister 2002, 39). 
 The importance of political cues communicated by elites during the referendum 
campaign, especially for voters with little prior information, was highlighted by Zaller (1992) 
and supported later by evidence from US studies. A campaign gains in significance when parties 
are internally divided or when an issue is new or unfamiliar (Lupia 1994). Similarly, LeDuc (2009) 
concludes that when parties do not have a comprehensive position on an issue, and the topic 
has not been debated earlier, voters are expected to pay more attention to the campaign 
discourse. In fact, divisions within a party over an important issue occur often, moreover, this 
is one the most frequent reasons for calling a referendum. The referendum itself is a variable, 
as its context is entangled with a variety of political factors, above and beyond the referendum 
issue, such as the popularity or unpopularity of the current government. In such a complex 
reality political cues and the campaign are of high importance (LeDuc 2002, 146–47). 
 To find their position on complex issues voters use the ‘shortcuts’ received from the 
political elite. These ‘shortcuts’ play an essential role in a final voting decision, which is often 
reached rather late in the campaign. Public opinion polls commonly find about a quarter, 
sometimes even a third, of voters still undecided in the final week of referendum campaigns 
(LeDuc 2009). The longer and more intense the public debates, the simpler it is for voters to 
make up their minds, as there is a lot of easily available information on the issue (Font and 
Rodriguez 2009). Regardless of the length and intensity of a campaign, party politics matters. 
Font and Rodriguez (2009) show that voters supported what their party had recommended and 
how potential political effects of their votes had been defined. Party cues were less important 
for those who had more information. 
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 Previous research on voters’ behavior and information illustrated that voters can make 
competent choices even with limited information by relying on elite cues which help them to 
overcome their information shortfalls. As a survey of California voters showed information 
shortcuts allowed badly informed voters to emulate the behavior of relatively well informed 
voters and, thus, make competent choices even with limited information (Lupia 1994, p.63). 
The lower the level of information among the electorate on an issue, the more determining the 
political cues for their final decision (LeDuc 2009, p.158). Kriesi (2005, pp.138-139) identified 
three heuristic strategies (the way of elaborating the voting decision with least efforts, with 
help of informational shortcuts) that are usually applied by voters: 1) The status-quo heuristic: 
the strategy of voting ‘No’, only 2.5 per cent of voters apply this heuristic), 2) The trust heuristic: 
people follow the advice of speakers whom they find trustworthy and 3) The partisan heuristic: 
citizens follow the recommendations made by the partisan elites to whom they feel close. 
 Heuristics help voters to arrive at competent decisions despite their lack of factual 
knowledge. In particular, party endorsements serve as shortcuts that allow citizens to imply 
their own position on a ballot issue without detailed information about it (Hobolt 2007, 155). 
The study of De Vreese and Semetko (2004) confirmed that when parties send mixed or unclear 
messages to their electorate on their stand over the referendum`s issue, they performed poorly 
even in mobilizing their own voters, not to mention in mobilizing voters without a clear party 
identification. The degree of consensus or division between and within political parties results 
in very different campaign modes and affects the decision-making process of the voters. 
Franklin (M. N. Franklin 2002, 755) explains: ‘A party that is split generally has minimal influence 
on the opinions of its supporters. A united party of government has most influence, along with 
a united opposition party’. Following these arguments, I expect that: 
 
H3: Clear party cues increase the likelihood for a referendum’s success. 
 
Control variables 
In addition to these three main effects, we also test for two control variables derived from the 
literature: turnout and the type of referendum (binding vs. consultative). First, turnout in 
referendums is generally lower than at elections (Mendez, Mendez, and Triga 2014, 17). 
However, participation can rise to higher levels if an issue engages voter interest or if there is 
an intensive campaign (LeDuc 2003). One argument could be that it is easier for a referendum 
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to be successful when few people vote because only those who are interested participate. At 
the same time, there is also the argument according to which when more people participate 
the likelihood of success is higher because that can show a general mobilization of the 
population. Furthermore, some countries have legal provisions on the minimal level of turnout 
for a vote to be valid, i.e. participation quorum. Consequently, high turnout may have some 
explanatory power when it comes to the success of a referendum. In the case of EU-related 
referendums high turnout was correlated with a vote against European integration (Qvortrup 
2016). Second, earlier research showed that when a referendum is binding, the participation is 
higher (compared to non-binding referendums) (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2004) and the 
likelihood of success can increase. When people perceive that their voice will make a difference, 
they may be tempted to cast a vote in favor of the proposal. However, this may also happen 
with non-binding referendums especially when the difference between the two types is very 
small in practice.  
 
Research design 
The analysis accounts for referendums organized at national level in Europe between 2001 and 
2013. This period was chosen to illustrate the recent trends in the referendum process. 
Furthermore, many Eastern European countries were acknowledged as democracies in this 
term and their accession to the EU confirmed this aspect. Europe was chosen as area of 
investigation for two reasons. First, modern direct democracy was invented in New England and 
France, while Switzerland implemented the first referendum: in the 1830s at sub-national and 
in 1848 at national level (Williams and Hume 2010). Second, Europe is the continent where the 
most referendums have been held, namely 62 per cent of all referendums registered worldwide 
(Marxer et al. 2007, 9).  
 The data excludes independence referendums since they represent a particular type of 
referendums with extremely high societal involvement. Besides, most of them were mandatory 
and this type of referendums1 as well as referendums initiated by a president or group of 
citizens are excluded.2 Referendums initiated by the president are not analyzed due to the 
                                                     
1 Mandatory referendums are not included, since they are prescribed by the Constitution and their initiation happens 
automatically when specific topics are concerned. This paper aims to identify the mechanisms of representatives` influence 
over the referendum process. 
2  Referendums initiated by the president are not analyzed due to the conceptual problem of how to differentiate (semi) 
presidential countries with strong executive power from representative, where the president has no nominal power and is 
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conceptual problem of how to differentiate (semi) presidential countries with strong executive 
power from representative, where the president has no nominal power and is appointed by the 
parliament. Furthermore, there is an empirical dilemma regarding the role of the president in 
the initiation process. It is quite often unclear whether it is a formal or a real one and in the 
absence of solid evidence, it is difficult to distinguish between the two. Research about the 
‘hidden’ initiators of a referendum lies outside the scope of this paper and thus we exclude such 
possibly confusing cases. Liechtenstein was not analyzed since this country is a hereditary 
monarchy with weak representative mechanisms. The Cyprus referendum on the Annan Plan - 
the reunification of the island and creation of a federal state after the Swiss model - in 2004 
was also excluded from the analysis, since the referendum was triggered by the UN Secretary-
General, Kofi Annan, with support of the United States and Great Britain (Drath 2010). The final 
country not to be included is Switzerland since it has the longest and most intensive tradition 
of direct democracy and, thus, being rather an exception than a rule in Europe. Its inclusion 
would distort the overall picture of European referendums. Out of the 31 cases included in the 
analysis, only two countries are not members of the EU - Iceland and Moldova. These countries 
are (number of referendums in brackets): Austria, Iceland (6), Italy (2), Lithuania (2), 
Luxembourg, Malta (2), Moldova, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia (9), 
Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom (see Appendix 1).  
 
Variable operationalization and data sources 
The dependent variable of this study – success of a referendum – is measured as a dichotomous 
variable coded as 0 if a referendum fails and 1 if a referendum passes. The popularity of the 
initiator (H1) is measured as the support of the population for their government or opposition 
reflected by surveys before the referendum. Furthermore, various sources were used for 
popularity rates – from online survey portals to Sunday opinion polls and newspaper articles.3 
When a governing coalition was the initiator, their opinion polls` results were added up to show 
                                                     
appointed by the parliament. The research on the ‘hidden’ initiators of a referendum would be out of the possible scope of 
this paper. 
3 (i) In the Maltese referendum on divorce for separated couples in May 2011 opinion polls from an online survey 
portal were used, URL: http://www.malta-surveys.com/election-poll-04-11.html [Accessed on 19.12.2014]   
(ii) In the case of the Slovenian referendums – in 2001, 2004, 2005 and 2010 - initiated by the parliamentary 
minority - the data on support of parliamentary opposition was gathered. The question in the opinion polls was: 
‘How do you assess the activity of the parliamentary opposition?’ The answers ‘very good’, ‘good’ and ‘average’ 
were added up to calculate the general level of support.  
11 
the level of their overall support. The popularity is coded as an ordinal variable where (1) stands 
for popularity rates lower than 25 and (2) for initiators with popularity between 26 and 45 per 
cent of public support and (3) for popularity rates higher than 45 per cent.4 The cutoff points 
for the levels of support have both a theoretical and empirical basis. From a theoretical 
perspective, when less than one quarter of the voting population supports the initiator then we 
can safely say that it has a low popularity. Empirically, we wanted to differentiate between high 
(up to 45 per cent) and very high popularity (over 46 per cent) because countries cluster around 
values in these two categories.  
To measure the size of support in parliament for the initiator (H2), the percentage of 
seats in parliament in accordance with the latest general election was considered.5 The variable 
is coded (1) if the initiator is a parliamentary minority or an extra-parliamentary party, (2) if the 
initiator has minimal majority (50-54 per cent of the seats), (3) when the initiator possesses a 
comfortable majority (55-70 per cent of the seats) and (4) when the initiator has oversized 
majority (more than 70 per cent of the seats). The cutoffs were set according to theories of 
coalition formation.  
The party cues (H3) were coded as mixed when unusual coalitions were formed around 
the referendum issue6, if traditional cleavages (e.g. left-right) were missing from the discourse7, 
or if single members of parties give recommendations in contrast to the overall line of their 
party. This independent variable is measured on a four-point ordinal scale coded (1) for 
completely mixed cues - corresponding to all three instances of mixed cues during campaign, 
(2) for cues including two mixed elements, (3) for cues with one unclear message and (4) for 
clear cues. The situation where all established political parties support the referendum issue is 
coded as a clear message, since the voters have no alternative viewpoints as all the parties are 
campaigning for the same outcome. The control variables are coded as follows: for type of 
                                                     
4 In two cases we used proxies for popularity rates. In the Luxembourg referendum on the Constitution of the European Union 
(2005), the initiators - Christian Social People`s Party and the Democratic Party - were coded with 3 (more than 45 per cent 
of public support) since these are the two big parties out of the three in Luxembourg’s political system. In the same line of 
argumentation, the initiators of the Slovak referendum on EU accession in 2003 were estimated as very popular due to the 
fact that all political parties were involved.  
5 In the Luxembourg referendum on the Constitution of the European Union held in July 2005, parliamentary size 
at the moment of initiation in 2003 was considered, since at the moment of voting the initiators were split into 
government and opposition. 
6 For instance, if certain political parties that usually oppose each other in general elections are on the same side in the 
referendum issue and campaign together. 
7 If there was more than one referendum on the same issue, only the current position of political parties is considered. 
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referendum (1) if it is advisory and (2) if binding; for turnout (1) when it is lower than 50 per 
cent, (2) if it is between 50 and 70 per cent and (3) higher than 70 per cent.8  
 
Results 
Out of the 31 analyzed referendums 18 were successful (58 per cent of the total). From these 
18 successful referendums, seven were on issues of European and NATO integration: accession 
to the European Union in Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia (2003); on NATO membership in 
Slovenia (2003); and on the Constitution of the European Union in Luxembourg and Spain 
(2005). During the investigated time period, only two referendums on European integration 
failed: the Dutch referendum on the Constitution of the European Union in 2005 and the 
Swedish referendum on the introduction of the Euro in 2003. Thus, integration of Europe is not 
only the most voted-on issue in the world (De Vreese & Semetko 2004; Mendez et al. 2014), 
but this type of referendum is also very successful.  
 Table 1 indicates variation on all variables analyzed in this study. For example, we notice 
that the majority of the analyzed referendums were initiated either by the parliamentary 
minority (45 per cent of cases) or by the minimal majority in the parliament (35 per cent of 
cases). Only five referendums were initiated by a comfortable majority. These referendums 
were: on the Constitution of the European Union in Luxembourg in 2005 (supported by 56 per 
cent of the Chamber of Deputies), on accession to the European Union in Poland in 2003 
(supported by 56 per cent of Sejm), the two referendums in Slovenia in 2003 - on accession to 
the European Union and on NATO membership (supported by 64 per cent of the National 
Assembly); the referendum on Alternative Vote in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland in 2011 (with support of 56 per cent of the House of Commons). As one can 
see, four referendums - all successful - out of five that were initiated by the comfortable 
parliamentary majority were on the issues of the European integration. This means that these 
issues enjoyed a solid consensus among the political elite. The Slovenian referendum in 2010 
on resolving the border dispute with Croatia was the only popular vote initiated by the 
oversized majority - backed up by 96 per cent of the National Assembly.  
 Table 1 also includes the results of the cross-tabulations between each independent and 
                                                     
8 Invalid votes are not considered in the data. The only exception is the Swedish referendum on the introduction of the Euro 
in September 2003, since all the accessible referendum results were calculated with the consideration of blank votes. Several 
cutoff points for turnout were tried and all provided fairly similar results.  
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control variable, on the one hand, and the dependent variable, on the other hand. Percentages 
are calculated within the categories of the independent variable. The bivariate analysis 
indicates that (quite) popular initiators win more referendums than unpopular ones. Only one 
out of the four referendums initiated by unpopular government (the Polish referendum on 
accession to the European Union in 2003) or unpopular opposition (the two Slovenian 
referendums in 2011 on opening secret service archives and on measures against illicit work 
and the Lithuanian referendum on construction of a new nuclear power plant in 2012) was 
successful. In contrast, quite popular initiators won 75 per cent of the initiated referendums. 
Very popular initiators were paradoxically less successful winning around 57 per cent of popular 
votes. The positive association coefficient confirms this finding.  
 
Table 1: The Association between the independent variables and success of referendum 
Independent variables  Failed 
(%) 
Adopted 
(%) 
N Coefficient 
Unpopular 75 25 4 
Quite popular 25 75 12 
Popular 43 57 14 
Minority 71 29 14 
Minimal majority 18 82 11 
Comfortable 
majority 
20 80 5 
Oversized majority 0 100 1 
Mixed 67 33 3 
Quite mixed 60 40 5 
Quite clear 29 71 14 
Clear 44 56 9 
Non-binding 29 71 17 
Binding 57 43 14 
Below 50% 42 58 19 
50-70% 50 50 8 
Above 70% 25 75 4 
Note: Reported coefficients are Phi.  
** significant at p < 0.05. 
 
The relationship between the size of parliamentary majority and success rates of referendums 
(H2) finds the strongest empirical support (association coefficient of 0.55, significant at the 0.05 
level. Initiators enjoying comfortable or oversized majority in the parliament tend to win 
referendums on a regular basis, while parliamentary minority wins initiated popular votes only 
in 29 per cent of cases. The success of initiators with minimal majority in the parliament are 
fairly similar – at a very high level – with those initiated by a comfortable majority (success rate 
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of 82 and 80 per cent respectively).  
 The analysis of party cues shows that mixed or quite mixed cues do not contribute to the 
success of a referendum (failure rate between 60 and 67 per cent) which is in line with the 
expectation (H3). Referendums accompanied by quite clear cues (with one confusing element) 
are more successful than the ones with clear cues (in 71 and 56 per cent of cases respectively). 
One possible explanation of this difference lies in the number of actors supporting the 
referendum. When the number of actors in favor of the referendum is small, the cues are more 
likely to be clear. When this number increases, the cues become less clear but also the likelihood 
for success increases since each political party chips in with its own supporters.  
 Binding referendums appear to be less successful than the non-binding ones. Of the non-
binding referendums, 71 per cent were adopted, while only 43 per cent of the binding 
referendums were successful. This concurs with the conclusion that in modern democracies 
non-binding referendums have the same political power as binding ones (Beramendi et al. 2008, 
53). Another possible explanation for this difference is that the requirements for non-binding 
referendums are more relaxed than those for the binding ones (e.g. quorum of approval, 
quorum of participation). Furthermore, the topics of non-binding referendums may be more 
appealing to citizens than those of some binding referendums. In the case of the later, since 
their outcome will be implemented, the initiators may be more cautious to subject to vote 
controversial issues. The filtering process may thus diminish the appeal of the topic to the 
electorate. The analysis of turnout shows that this factor is weakly associated with the success 
of referendums. There are more successful referendums within the low turnout category 
compared to the ones with average turnout. However, three out of four referendums with high 
turnout were successful.  
 Let us now turn to the multivariate an alysis and see how these variables can explain 
the likelihood of referendum success. Table 2 includes two models of binary logistic regression: 
the first tests the three formulated hypotheses and the second includes the control variables. 
The pseudo-R2 indicates a good fit of the model with a higher value for the one including the 
control variables. When interpreting the results, we will refer both to statistical significance and 
to strength of effect (since this is the entire universe of cases and not a representative sample). 
The results broadly confirm the findings of the bivariate correlations. The popularity of the 
initiator increases only marginally the likelihood for success in a referendum (OR=1.07). When 
controlling for type of referendum and turnout (model 2) this likelihood is considerably higher 
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(OR=2.11) indicating the existence of a strong positive effect. Consequently, there is empirical 
support for H1 only when including the control variables.  
 The size of parliamentary majority (H2) finds strong empirical support and initiators with 
a comfortable majority in the legislature are almost five times (OR=4.94, statistically significant 
at 0.1) more likely to succeed as compared to the initiators from the parliamentary minority. In 
the model that includes the control variables the likelihood is even higher (OR=6.39, statistically 
significant at the 0.05 level).  A similar strong effect is visible for the party cues (H3): 
referendums with clear political cues are 1.61 times more likely to be successful compared to 
those with mixed cues). The effect is considerably stronger (OR=3.99) and statistically significant 
at the 0.1 level when controlling for type of referendums and turnout.  
 
Table 2: Binary logistic regression 
 Model 1  Model 2 
Popularity of the Initiator 1.07 (0.63)  2.11 (0.80) 
Size of Parliamentary Majority 4.94* (0.70)  6.39** (0.76) 
Party Cues 1.61 (0.51)  3.99* (0.91) 
Type of Referendum   0.04** (1.40) 
Turnout   1.34 (0.97) 
Nagelkerke R2 0.33  0.56 
-2 log likelihood 32.06  24.43 
N 30 
Note: Reported coefficients are odds-ratios (standard errors in brackets).  
** significant at p < 0.05; * significant at p < 0.1;  
 
 
Among the control variables, the analysis shows that the type of referendums have an almost 
deterministic effect on the success of a referendum. According to the results, binding 
referendums are approximately 20 times less likely to be successful than the non-binding ones 
(for OR smaller than 1 we interpret the reciprocal), a finding which contradicts the theory. The 
result is somewhat surprising given the relatively weak association between type and success 
of referendums (see Table 1). One explanation for the strong effect is the presence of other 
variables in the model: for example, many non-binding referendums were initiated by 
parliamentary majorities or benefit from clear party cues; both factors are likely to augment 
the statistical effect for types of referendums. Referendums with high turnout have slightly 
higher chances of success than the ones with low turnout (OR=1.34).  
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Conclusion 
This article explored the effect of institutional factors on the success of top-down referendums 
organized in Europe between 2001 and 2013. The statistical (bivariate and the binary logistic 
regression) illustrated that the size of parliamentary majority and the clarity of party cues are 
influential factors for a referendum success. The popularity of the initiator fails to provide 
compelling explanatory power. While quite popular initiators are more successful than 
unpopular initiators, the comparison of the referendums initiated by very popular and quite 
popular initiators shows that very popular initiators are less successful. This finding suggests 
that the popularity of the initiator contributes to the outcome of a referendum only to a limited 
extent. 
 These findings nuance and complement the picture drawn by previous research on 
referendums. The article bears broader methodological and empirical implications. It proposed 
an analytical framework aimed at the identification of a set of institutional factors and their 
potential impact on the success of referendums Europe-wide. It put together several variables 
derived from the literature and used in previous research to expand the scope of existing 
dimensions. The framework is not country specific and is applicable to a wide range of 
referendums, thus providing a relevant reference point for further research in or outside 
Europe. We also suggested a measurement for successful referendums and advanced the idea 
of standard measurement for initiator’s popularity and party cues. This allows for comparative 
studies (medium and large N) that can move beyond single-case studies where the 
measurement of such variables often follows a qualitative or context-sensitive path.  
Empirically, this is the first comparative study focusing on the institutional components 
of referendums’ success in Europe in the 21st century. This paper serves as a significant 
endeavor promoting the thorough understanding of how referendums function and how they 
can be won. In this sense, our findings build a bridge between academics and policy-makers: 
insights over success enhancing/hindering factors for a referendum are crucial for initiators, 
their political rivals and decision-makers in general. The identification of causes behind the 
success of a referendum provides a practical competitive advantage to the campaigners as it 
encompasses the referendum experience and successful strategies in several countries.  
 Some inherent limitations occurred and they can be overcome by further research. First, 
the reasons and the subsequent results of the initiation were not explored. In cases where the 
initiators were against the referendum issue and the referendum failed, they turned out, 
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actually, to win and not to lose the referendum. These issues were not considered in this study 
and no differentiation between unsuccessful referendums is made. Second, due to access and 
language barriers media coverage and campaign financing issues could not be addressed. 
Future studies may enlarge the scope of analysis either by including these issues or by adding 
new types of referendums to the picture. More precisely, one could compare the ways in which 
institutional factors play a role in top-down as opposed to bottom-up referendums. 
18 
Appendix 1: List of countries with referendums between 2001 and 2013 
COUNTRY DATE TOPIC OUTCOME 
Austria 2013 Professional army/ Conscription Failed 
Italy 2001 Regionalization Adopted 
Italy 2006 Constitutional reform (new powers to the prime 
minister and the regions) 
Failed 
Iceland 2012 Constitutional Amendment 1: Whether Constitution 
Council's proposals should form its basis? 
Adopted 
Iceland 2012 Constitutional Amendment 2: Whether natural 
resources should be declared national property? 
Adopted 
Iceland 2012 Constitutional Amendment 3: Whether it should 
include provisions on an established (national) church 
in Iceland? 
Adopted 
Iceland 2012 Constitutional Amendment 4: Whether it should 
include a provision on authorizing the election of 
particular individuals to the Althingi more than is the 
case at present? 
Adopted 
Iceland 2012 Constitutional Amendment 5: Whether it should 
include a provision on giving equal weight to votes cast 
in all parts of the country? 
Adopted 
Iceland 2012 Constitutional Amendment 6. Whether it should 
include a provision stating that a certain proportion of 
the electorate is able to demand that issues are put to 
a referendum? 
Adopted 
Lithuania 2008 Prolonged operation of the Ignalina nuclear power 
plant 
Failed (low 
turnout) 
Lithuania 2012 Construction of a new nuclear power  plant Failed 
Luxembourg 2005 Constitution of the European Union Adopted 
Malta 2003 European Union Membership Adopted 
Malta 2011 Divorce for separated couples Adopted 
Moldova 2010 Popular election of the President Failed (low 
turnout) 
Netherlands 2005 Constitution of the European Union Failed 
Poland 2003 European Union Membership Adopted 
Portugal 2007 Legalizing abortion Adopted 
Slovakia 2003 European Union Membership Adopted 
Slovenia 2001 Fertility treatment for unmarried women Failed 
Slovenia 2003 European Union Membership Adopted 
Slovenia 2003 NATO Membership Adopted 
Slovenia 2004 Minority rights Failed 
Slovenia 2005 Political control on the country`s public broadcaster 
(RTVS) 
Adopted 
Slovenia 2010 Border dispute agreement with Croatia Adopted 
Slovenia 2010 Public broadcaster law Failed 
Slovenia 2011 Opening secret service archives Failed 
Slovenia 2011 Measures against illicit work Failed 
Spain 2005 Constitution of the European Union Adopted 
Sweden 2003 Introduction of the Euro Failed 
The United Kingdom 2011 Use of Alternative Vote Failed 
 
19 
List of references: 
Atikcan, Ece Özlem. 2015. Framing the European Union: The Power of Political Arguments in 
Shaping European Integration. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Batory, Agnes. 2007. “Euroscepticism in the Hungarian Party System: Voices from 
theWilderness?” In Opposing Europe?: The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism 
Volume 1: Case Studies and Country Surveys, edited by Aleks Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart, 
263–76. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Beramendi, Virginia, Andrew Ellis, Bruno Kaufman, Miriam Kornblith, Larry LeDuc, Paddy 
McGuire, Theo Schiller, and Palle Svensson. 2008. Direct Democracy. The International 
IDEA Handbook. Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance. 
Dalton, Russell J. 2008. Citizen Politics. Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced 
Industrial Democracies. 5th ed. Washington DC: CQ Press. 
Dalton, Russell J., Bruce E. Cain, and Susan E. Scarrow. 2003. “Democratic Publics and 
Democratic Institutions.” In Democracy Transformed?, edited by Bruce E. Cain, Russell J. 
Dalton, and Susan E. Scarrow, 250–75. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Drath, Viola. 2010. “The Cyprus Referendum: An Island Divided by Mutual Distrust.” American 
Foreign Policy Interests 26 (4): 341–52. 
Font, Joan, and Elisa Rodriguez. 2009. “Intense but Useless? Public Debate and Voting Factors 
in Two Referendums in Spain.” In Referendums and Representative Democracy: 
Responsiveness, Accountability and Deliberation, edited by Maija Setala and Theo 
Schiller, 162–85. London and New York: Routledge. 
Franklin, Mark, Michael Marsh, and Christopher Wlezien. 1994. “Attitudes toward Europe and 
Referendum Votes: A Response to Siune and Svensson.” Electoral Studies 13 (2): 117–21. 
Franklin, Mark N. 2002. “Learning from the Danish Case: A Comment on Palle Svensson’s 
Critique of the Franklin Thesis.” European Journal of Political Research 41 (6): 751–57. 
Franklin, Mark N., Cees van der Eijk, and Michael Marsh. 1995. “Referendum Outcomes and 
Trust in Government: Public Support for Europe in the Wake of Maastricht.” West 
European Politics 18 (3): 101–17. 
Garry, John, Michael Marsh, and Richard Sinnott. 2005. “‘Second-Order’ versus ‘Issue-Voting’ 
Effects in EU Referendums: Evidence from the Irish Nice Treaty Referendums.” European 
Union Politics 6 (2): 201–21. 
20 
Geissel, Brigitte, and Kenneth Newton, eds. 2012. Evaluating Democratic Innovations: Curing 
the Democratic Malaise? London: Routledge. 
Gilland Lutz, Karin, and Simon Hug, eds. 2009. Financing Referendum Campaigns. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Hobolt, Sara Binzer. 2007. “Taking Cues on Europe? Voter Competence and Party 
Endorsements in Referendums on European Integration.” European Journal of Political 
Research 46 (2): 151–82. 
———. 2009. Europe in Question. Referendums on European Integration. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Hug, Simon. 2003. Voices of Europe: Citizens, Referendums, and European Integration. 
Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. 
Joas, Marko. 2013. “Conclusions. An Evaluation of Democratic Innovations in Europe.” In 
Participatory Democratic Innovations in Europe. Improving the Quality of Democracy?, 
249–62. 
Kriesi, Hanspeter. 2005. Direct Democratic Choice. The Swiss Experience. Plymouth: Lexington 
Books. 
———. 2012a. “Direct Democracy: Swiss Experience.” In Evaluating Democratic Innovations, 
Curing the Democratic Malaise?, edited by Brigitte Geissel and Kenneth Newton, 39–55. 
London and New York: Routledge. 
———. , ed. 2012b. Political Communication in Direct Democratic Campaigns. Enlightening or 
Manipulating? Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Lachat, Romain, and Pascal Sciarini. 2002. “When Do Election Campaigns Matter, and to 
Whom? Results from the 1999 Swiss Election Panel Study.” In Do Political Campaigns 
Matter? Campaign Effects in Elections and Referendums, edited by David M. Farrell and 
Rudiger Schmitt-Beck, 41–57. London and New York: Routledge. 
Lacy, Dean, and Emerson M.S. Niou. 2000. “A Problem with Referendums.” Journal of 
Theoretical Politics 12 (1): 5–31. 
LeDuc, Lawrence. 2002. “Referendums and Elections: How Do Campaigns Differ?” In Do 
Political Campaigns Matter? Campaign Effects in Elections and Referendums, edited by 
David M. Farrell and Rudiger Schmitt-Beck, 145–62. London and New York: Routledge. 
———. 2003. The Politics of Direct Democracy: Referendums in Global Perspective. Toronto: 
Broadview Press. 
21 
———. 2009. “Campaign Tactics and Outcomes in Referendum.” In Referendums and 
Representative Democracy, edited by Maija Setala and Theo Schiller, 139–61. London and 
New York: Routledge. 
Lupia, Arthur. 1994. “Shortcuts versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in 
California Insurance Reform Elections.” American Political Science Review 88 (1): 63–76. 
Luthardt, Wolfgang. 1994. Direkte Demokratie: Ein Vergleich in Westeuropa. Baden-Baden: 
Nomos. 
Marcinkowski, Frank. 2007. “Beyond Information and Opinion. The Importance of Public 
Communication in the Referendum Process.” In Direct Democracy in Europe: 
Developments and Prospects, edited by Zoltan Tibor Pallinger, Bruno Kaufmann, Wilfried 
Marxer, and Theo Schiller, 94–107. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. 
Marxer, Wilfried, Zoltan Tibor Pallinger, Bruno Kaufmann, and Theo Schiller. 2007. 
“Foreword.” In Direct Democracy in Europe: Developments and Prospects, edited by 
Zoltan Tibor Pallinger, Bruno Kaufmann, Wilfried Marxer, and Theo Schiller, 7–11. 
Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. 
McAllister, Ian. 2002. “Calculating or Capricious? The New Politics of Late Deciding Voters.” In 
Do Political Campaigns Matter? Campaign Effects in Elections and Referendums, edited 
by David M. Farrell and Rudiger Schmitt-Beck, 22–40. London and New York: Routledge. 
Mendez, Fernando, Mario Mendez, and Vasiliki Triga. 2014. Referendums and the European 
Union: A Comparative Inquiry. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Newton, Kenneth. 2012. “Curing the Democratic Malaise with Democratic Innovations.” In 
Evaluating Democratic Innovations. Curing the Democratic Malaise?, edited by Brigitte 
Geissel and Kenneth Newton, 3–20. London: Routledge. 
Norris, Pippa. 2011. Democratic Deficit: Critical Citizens Revisited. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Qvortrup, Matt. 2005. A Comparative Study of Referendums: Government by the People. 
Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
Qvortrup, Matt. 2016. “Referendums on Membership and European Integration 1972–2015.” 
The Political Quarterly 87 (1): 61–68. 
Reif, Karlheinz, and Herman Schmitt. 1980. “Nine Second-Order National Elections – A 
Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of European Elections Results.” European Journal 
of Political Research 8 (1): 3–44. 
22 
Sager, Fritz, and Marc Buehlmann. 2009. “Checks and Balances in Swiss Direct Democracy.” In 
Referendums and Representative Democracy: Responsiveness, Accountability and 
Deliberation, edited by Maija Setala and Theo Schiller, 186–206. London and New York: 
Routledge. 
Schmitt-Beck, Rudiger, and David M. Farrell. 2002. “Studying Political Campaigns and Their 
Effects.” In Do Political Campaigns Matter? Campaign Effects in Elections and 
Referendums, edited by David M. Farrell and Rudiger Schmitt-Beck, 1–21. London and 
New York: Routledge. 
Setala, Maija. 2009. “Introduction.” In Referendums and Representative Democracy. 
Responsiveness, Accountability and Deliberation, edited by Maija Setala and Theo 
Schiller, 1–10. London and New York: Routledge / ECPR. 
———. 2013. “Deliberation and Aggregation in Different Forms of Direct Democracy.” In 
Participatory Democratic Innovations in Europe: Improving the Quality of Democracy?, 
edited by Brigitte Geissel and Marko Joas, 179–97. Opladen: Barbara Budrich. 
Setala, Maija, and Theo Schiller, eds. 2012. Citizens’ Initiatives in Europe: Procedures and 
Consequences of Agenda-Setting by Citizens. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Siune, Karen, and Palle Svensson. 1993. “The Danes and the Maastricht Treaty: The Danish EC 
Referendum of June 1992.” Electoral Studies 12 (2): 99–111. 
Siune, Karen, Palle Svensson, and Ole Tonsgaard. 1994. “The European Union: The Danes Said 
‘no’ in 1992 but ‘yes’ in 1995: How and Why?” Electoral Studies 13 (2): 107–16. 
Svensson, Palle. 2007. “Voting Behaviour in the European Constitution Process.” In Direct 
Democracy in Europe: Developments and Prospects, edited by Zoltän Tibor Pallinger, 
Bruno Kaufmann, Wilfried Marxer, and Theo Schiller, 163–73. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für 
Sozialwissenschaften. 
Szczerbiak, Aleks, and Paul Taggart. 2004. “The Politics of European Referendum Outcomes 
and Turnout: Two Models.” West European Politics 27 (4): 557–83. 
Trechsel, Alexander H., and Pascal Sciarini. 1998. “Direct Democracy in Switzerland: Do Elites 
Matter?” European Journal of Political Research 33 (1): 99–124. 
Vreese, Claes H. de, and Holli A. Semetko. 2004. Political Campaigning in Referendums. 
Framing the Referendum Issue. London and New York: Routledge. 
Walker, Mark Clarence. 2003. The Strategic Use of Referendums: Power, Legitimacy, and 
Democracy. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
23 
Williams, George, and David Hume. 2010. People Power: The History and Future of the 
Referendum in Australia. Sydney: University of New South Wales Press Ltd. 
Zaller, John R. 1992. The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
